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EXTENSION OF THE MOST FAVORED LENDER DOCTRINE
UNDER FEDERAL USURY LAW:
A CONTRARY VIEW
I.

INTRODUCTION

The generally high level of interest rates during recent years has
expanded the importance of federal statutes as a source of usury law.'
In states which have been slow in raising interest rate ceilings in response
to increases in the lenders' cost of funds, preemptive federal legislation
has become essential to the maintenance of an adequate supply of credit. 2
The most extreme form of legislative action-complete preemption of
state interest rate ceilings-has thus far been taken only with respect to
residential first mortgage loans.3 A less drastic type of statute, which
1. See Samuels, Usury Preemption: The Federal/State Scheme, 98

BANKING

L.J. 892, 892-93 (1981).
2. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. S3177-80 (daily ed. March 27, 1980) (remarks
of Sen. Bumpers, referring principally to conditions in the state of Arkansas).
3. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501(a)(1), 94 Stat. 161 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7
(Supp. IV 1980)). The statute applies to residential first mortgage loans which

are "federally related," a broadly defined term. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7(a)(1)(A)
(Supp. IV 1980). See also Regulations for Federally Related Mortgage Loans,
12 C.F.R. § 590 (1982). The statute also applies to any first mortgage loan
made by an individual financing the sale of his principal residence. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1735f-7(a)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1980). The preemption is subject to state override

by express legislative action prior to April 1, 1983. Id. at § 1735f-7(b)(2).

As

of March 31, 1982, twelve states had exercised their override perogative with
respect to mortgage rate preemption. See Ch. 94, § 5, Alaska Stats. of 1981;
COLORADO REV. STAT. § 5-13-101 (Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 478-12
(Supp. 1981); Ch. 1156, § 32, Iowa Stats. of 1980; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-207a
(Supp. 1980); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A § 1-110 (Supp. 1981); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 63 (note) (West Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. § 47.203 (1980);
Ch. 668, § 11, Nevada Stats. of 1981; S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-34 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §54-3-15 (Supp. 1981); Ch. 45, §50,
Wisc. Stats. of 1981.
House and Senate bills introduced during 1981 would prospectively preempt state interest rate ceilings on all loans (i.e., consumer, business, and
agricultural), subject to a three-year period for state override. See H.R. 2501,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H937-38 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981) (introduced by Rep. LaFalce); S. 1406, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S6627
(daily ed. June 22, 1981) (introduced by Sens. Lugar, Garn, Proxmire and
D'Amato). A House banking subcommittee tabled H.R. 2501.
127 CONG.
REC. D1276 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1981). Senator Garn reintroduced S. 1406 as
Title IV of the Financial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act, a sweeping deregulation bill. S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. Sll,254-76,
Sll,265-66 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1981). Prompt enactment of S. 1720 had begun
to appear unlikely by January, 1982. See Politics Likely to Stall Major Banking Reform Bills This Year, [Jan.-June] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 2, at C-3
(Jan. 11, 1982).

(1077)
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establishes an increment over the federal reserve discount rate 4 as an
alternative to the rate allowed by state law, has long been applicable to
all loans made by national banks. 5 Under the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDAMCA),6 an alternative federal rate is temporarily provided for business and agricultural

loans made by any person. 7 Under permanent provisions of DIDAMCA,
an alternative federal rate is available for loans made by state-chartered

federally insured banks, by all federally insured savings and loan associations, and by all federally insured credit unions.8
4. The Federal Reserve discount rate is the rate charged by the Federal
Reserve Bank for short-term loans to its member banks. BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 418 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). See also notes 69-71 and accompanying text
infra.
5. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 25, 48 Stat. 191, amending the National
Bank Act, ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 108 (1864) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 85
(Supp. IV 1980)). National banks have the option of charging up to one
percent in excess of the Federal Reserve discount rate.

Id.

For the text of

§ 85, see note 24 infra.
6. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 161 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV 1980)) [hereinafter cited as DIDAMCA]. For a general synopsis of
DIDAMCA, see Weaver & O'Malley, The Depository Institutions Deregulation
& Monetary Control Act: An Overview, 98 BANKING L.J. 100 (1981).
7. DIDAMCA, supra note 6, § 511-512 as amended by Pub. L. 96-399
§§ 324(b), (c), 94 Stat. 1614, 1648 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 86a (Supp. IV 1980)).
Until April 1, 1983, § 86a allows any person to charge five percent over the
discount rate, including any surcharge, for business or agricultural loans in the
amount of at least $1,000. 12 U.S.C. § 86a (Supp. IV 1980). Section 86a
replaced similarly structured statutes that had been in effect for federally
insured lenders during most of the period since October, 1974. See Act of
Oct. 29, 1974, Pub. L. 93-501 § 201, 88 Stat. 1557, 1558 (expired July 1, 1977);
Act of Nov. 5, 1979, Pub. L. 96-104, § 105, 93 Stat. 789, 791; Act of Dec. 28,
1979, Pub. L. 96-161 §§ 205, 212, 93 Stat. 1233, 1237-38, 1239-40. Section 86a
is subject to state override at any time prior to its expiration on April 1, 1983.
DIDAMCA, supra note 6, § 512. As of March 31, 1982, six states had overridden § 86a. See COLORADO REV. STAT. § 5-13-102 (Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 478-12 (Supp. 1981); Ch. 1156, § 32, Iowa Stats. of 1980; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 63 (note) (West Supp. 1981); Ch. 668, § 11, Nevada Stats.
of 1981; S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 54-3-15 (Supp. 1981).
8. DIDAMCA, supra note 6, § 521 (state-chartered, federally insured banks,
savings banks, and branches of foreign banks), § 522 (federally insured savings
and loan associations), § 523 (federally insured credit unions) (codified respectively at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831d, 1730g, 1785g (Supp. IV 1980)). The parallel
language of these sections accords the respective lending institutions an alternative rate of one percent over the federal reserve discount rate. Id. For
a discussion of the additional preemptive aspects of these sections, see notes
156-61, 194-95 and accompanying text infra. For the text of § 521, see text
accompanying note 140 infra. A state override option with no expiration date
applies to each of these statutes. DIDAMCA, supra note 6, § 525. As of
March 31, 1982, six states had overridden §§ 521-523. See COLORADO REV. STAT.
§ 5-13-104 (Supp. 1981); Ch. 1156, § 32 Iowa Stats. of 1980; MAINE REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9A § 1-110 (Supp. 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 63 (note)
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The federal rates, however, do not always provide an attractive alternative to lenders. 9 Primarily in the area of consumer loans, national
banks have invoked judicial and regulatory interpretations of section 85
of Title 12 of the United States Code (section 85) 10 to avail themselves
of two privileged applications of state interest rate ceilings. Under the
"most favored lender" doctrine, a national bank may charge interest at
the highest rate permitted by state law to any competing lender for the
same class of loan."
And under the Supreme Court's holding in
Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,12 a national

bank which extends credit across state lines is bound only by the usury
law of the state where it is located, without regard to otherwise applicable choice of law rules.' 3 There has recently developed a clear consensus among regulatory agencies that the most favored lender doctrine
and the Marquette holding apply not only to national banks under
section 85, but also to other federally insured lenders under sections 521
14
to 523 of DIDAMCA (sections 521 to 523).
This comment will trace the development of the most favored lender
doctrine 15 and analyze the Supreme Court's holding in Marquette.16
It will examine the language and legislative history of sections 521 to
(West Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §54-3-15 (Supp. 1981); Ch. 45,
§ 50, Wisc. Stats. of 1981.
House and Senate bills introduced during 1981 would have extended the
federal alternative of one percent over the Federal Reserve discount rate to
any person for any type of loan, but would have expired on April 1, 1983 and
have been subject to state override prior to that date. H.R. 3172, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H1460 (daily ed. April 9, 1981) (introduced by Rep.
Alexander); S. 963, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S3789-92 (daily ed.
April 9, 1981) (introduced by Sens. Bumpers and Pryor). A house banking
subcommittee tabled H.R. 3172. 127 CONG. REC. D1276 (daily ed. Oct. 21,
1981). As of March 31, 1982 S. 963 had not been reported out of Committee.
[1981-1982] CONG. INDEX (CCH) 21,011.
9. See Samuels, supra note 1, at 904-05.

Ironically, the Federal Reserve

Board itself has strongly advised against utilizing the discount rate as a basis
for interest rate ceilings. See To Authorize Loans at Interest Rates in Excess
of Certain State Usury Ceilings and To Amend the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 963 and
S. 1406 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 485-86
(1981) (statement of Nancy H. Teeters, Member, Bd. of Governors, Federal

Reserve System).
10. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. IV 1980).

For the text of § 85, see note 24

infra.

11. See notes 82-99 and accompanying text infra.
12. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
13. See notes 178-87 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 156-61, 194-95 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 20-99 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 178-87 and accompanying text infra.
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523 17 and evaluate alternative interpretations of the statutes' provisions.18 Finally, it will conclude that in augmenting federal usury law
under sections 521 to 523, Congress did not contemplate extension of
the most favored lender doctrine, but that it did intend to expand the
scope of the Marquette decision to cover loans made by all federally
insured depository institutions. 19
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOST FAVORED LENDER DOCTRINE

A. The Statutory Structure

Federal usury law originated during the Civil War, when legislation
was enacted to establish and regulate a network of federally chartered
banks. 20 In 1863, Congress initially determined the maximum interest
rates that would be available to national banks by deferring completely
to the legal rate established under state law. 21 A year later, after rejecting a proposal for a uniform rate limitation of seven percent, 22 Congress
adopted section 30 of the National Bank Act of 1864 (section 30).23 The
wording of section 30 has survived with only minor changes, although
the current version in section 85 contains an additional provision which
allows an alternative rate of one percent over the federal reserve dis24
count rate.
17. See notes 136-55 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 162-77, 194-216 and accompanying text infra.

19. See notes 194-216 and accompanying text infra.
20. See generally Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REV.
565, 570-73 (1966). The immediate purpose of the Currency Act of 1863 was
to finance the Civil War by facilitating the sale of Government securities. Id.
at 570. Prior to that time, national banks were individually enfranchised by
Congress, and the permissible interest rates were specified in their charters.
See, e.g., Fleckner v. United States Bank, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 338, 349 (1823).
21. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 46, 12 Stat. 665, 678-79. Section 46
of the Currency Act of 1863 permitted national banks to charge the rate of

interest "as is for the time the established rate of interest for delay in the
payment of money, in the absence of contract between the parties, by the
laws of the several states."

22.

CONG. GLOBE,

Id.

38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2123 (1864).

23. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 99, 108 (current version at
12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86 (Supp. IV 1980)). Section 30 also prescribed penalties and
a period for the limitation of actions. Id. For the current codification of
these provisions, see 12 U.S.C. § 86 (Supp. IV 1980). For the text of the current version of section 30 and a chronology of the material changes in the
language of the statute since its enactment, see note 24 infra.
24. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. Section 85 now reads as
follows:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan
or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State,

Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at a rate of 1 per
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The majority of the following discussion relates to the first sentence
of section 85, which can be divided into an "Allowance Clause" and an
"Exception Clause." 25 The references will be as follows:
centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper
in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district
where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater, and no more,
except that where by the laws of any State a different rate is limited
for banks organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be
allowed for associations organized or existing in any such State under
this chapter. When no rate is fixed by the laws of the State, or Territory, or District, the bank may take, receive, reserve, or charge a rate
not exceeding 7 per centum, or I per centum in excess of the discount
rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve
bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater, and such interest may be taken in advance,
reckoning the days for which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt
has to run. The maximum amount of interest or discount to be
charged at a branch of an association located outside of the States of
the United States and the District of Columbia shall be at the rate
allowed by the laws of the country, territory, dependency, province,
dominion, insular possession, or other political subdivision where the
branch is located. And the purchase, discount, or sale of a bona fide
bill of exchange, payable at another place than the place of such purchase, discount, or sale, at not more than the current rate of exchange
for sight drafts in addition to the interest, shall not be considered as
taking or receiving a greater rate of interest.
12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. IV 1980). The statute has undergone the following
changes since its enactment:
(a) When § 30 was codified in the Revised Statutes of 1878, the word
"District" was added to the first sentence, ostensibly to include the District of
Columbia. See Revised Statutes of 1878, tit. LXII, ch. 3, § 5197. Also, the
words "or existing" were added to the latter part of the first sentence. Id.
The meaning of "organized or existing" has been a factor in litigation under
§ 85, but has not yet been resolved. See note 132 infra.
(b) In the Banking Act of 1933, a clause was added to permit an alternative
federal rate of 1% over the federal reserve discount rate. Act of June 16, 1933,
ch. 89, § 25, 48 Stat. 191. At the same time, the words "of issue" were deleted
from the first sentence. Id. For a discussion of the significance of this deletion,
see notes 69-81 and accompanying text infra.
(c) In the Banking Act of 1935, a provision was added to § 85 to govern
interest rates charged at foreign branches of national banks. Act of Aug. 23,
1935, ch. 614, § 314, 49 Stat. 711.
(d) From 1974 through 1979, § 85 was amended several times to reflect
provisions for a variable federal rate on business and agricultural loans. See
note 7 supra.
25. For the full text of § 85, see note 24 supra. The second sentence of

§ 85 does not warrant extended discussion, since this provision has been so
narrowly and authoritatively construed as to render it virtually meaningless.
See Daggs v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 177 U.S. 549 (1900); Hiatt v. San Francisco
Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 504 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 948 (1966). These
cases hold that the phrase "[w]hen no rate is fixed by the laws of the state . . ."
refers only to circumstances where no rate is "allowed" by state law, i.e., where
state law prohibits the taking of any interest at all. See 177 U.S. at 555; 361
F.2d at 507. See Shanks, Special Usury Problems Applicable to National Banks,
87 BANKING L.J. 483, 488 (1979) (suggesting that "for all practical purposes"
the second sentence of § 85 may be ignored). See also Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 138 (John E. Shockey, Chief Counsel),
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The Allowance Clause
Any association may

charge on any loan ...

interest at the

rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District
where the bank is located, or at a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in
effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district
where the bank is located, whichever may be greater, and no
more 26 (the italicized wording was added in 1933 27)
The Exception Clause
except that where by the laws of any State a different rate is
limited for banks [of issue] organized under State laws, the rate
so limited shall be allowed for associations organized or existing
in any such State under this chapter 28 (the bracketed wording
was deleted in 1933 29).
These terms will be utilized as the context requires for reference to the
first sentence of either the current version of section 85 or the original
language in section 30.30
B. Tiffany and the Legislative History of Section 30
Less than ten years after the National Bank Act became law, the
Supreme Court was called upon to interpret both the Allowance and
Exception Clauses in Tiffany v. National Bank.3 1 At issue in Tiffany
was the application of Missouri usury law which permitted non-bank
lenders to extend credit at ten percent, while limiting state banks to
eight percent.8 2 The defendant national bank had charged nine percent,
31
which was alleged to be usurious.
In affirming a judgment for the bank, the Tiffany Court construed
the Allowance Clause broadly and held that "the rate allowed by the
laws of the state" referred not to the rate allowed for state banks, but
[1980-1981 Transfer Binder]

FED. BANKING

L. REP. (CCH)

85,219 at 77,328

(Feb. 8, 1980), citing Shanks, supra.
26, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. IV 1980).
27. Act of June 16, 1933, supra note 24.
28, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. IV 1980).
29, Act of June 16, 1933, supra note 24.
30. See note 24 supra.
31. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873).
32. Id. at 411.
33. Id. at 410.
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to the rate allowed for lenders in general.84 In interpreting the Exception Clause, the Court acknowledged that if read literally, that clause
would apply whenever a "different rate" (a rate higher or lower) was
permitted for state banks. 35 The Tiffany Court nevertheless held that
the Exception Clause applied only where the rate for state banks was
higher than that allowed for lenders in general. 86 The Court noted that
the phrase "and no more" modified the Allowance Clause only, and that
the Exception Clause was strictly an enabling provision, not intended to
restrict national banks to a rate lower than was generally permitted. 37
Under Tiffany, the Exception Clause operates only where state banks are
entitled to charge a special rate that is unavailable to lenders generally.S
The holding in Tiffany seems to comport with section 30's limited
legislative history. 9 The record of substantive discussion and debate
indicates that the Senate declined to adopt a version of the statute that
would have placed national and state banks "on an equal footing" by
restricting national banks to the rate permitted for state banks.4 0 Senator
Sherman, who ultimately drafted the final version of section 30,4 1 clearly
34. Id. at 411. The court used the terms "natural persons" and "lenders
generally" interchangeably in recognition of the prevalence during that period
of individuals operating as private bankers. See id. at 411-12; F. REDLICH,
THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING

67-70 (1951).

35. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 411-12.
36. Id. The Court observed that the statute "speaks of allowances to
National banks and limitations upon State banks, but it does not declare that
the rate limited to state banks shall be the maximum rate allowed to National
banks." Id. at 412.
37. Id. This construction has been criticized for effectively substituting
"higher" for "different" in the Exception Clause. See Comment, National and
State Bank Interest Rates Under the National Bank Act: Preference or Parity?,
58 IOWA L. REv. 1250, 1259 (1973). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 509
F.2d 872, 879-80 n.18 (8th Cir. 1975). On the other hand, as noted in the
Tiffany opinion itself, the alternative construction, under which "different"
would mean either higher or lower, would read into the Exception Clause the
phrase "and no more," which does not appear there at all. Tiffany v. National
Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 412.
38. See 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 413.
39. See generally CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 1254, 1257, 1352-54, 137376, 1411-12, 1431, 1451-53, 1531, 1680-81, 1697, 1771, 1871, 2123-27, 2145,
2206-07, 2450, and 2664 (1864). For the most informative substantive discussion, see id. at 2123-27 (Senate debates). For a thoughtful but strained analysis
of the Senate debates which suggests a conclusion contrary to Tiffany, see
Comment, supra note 37, at 1250-60.
40. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 2126 (statement of Sen. Doolittle).
An amendment to this effect was proposed by Senator Henderson, but was
withdrawn before the results of a roll call vote on its adoption were announced.
See id. This development in the Senate has been interpreted by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as a defeat for the concept of competitive equality
between national and state banks. See Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855, 862 (6th Cir. 1972).
41. See

CONG. GLOBE,

supra note 22, at 2145.
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indicated that he would have supported the approach taken in Tiffany.
The Senator stated that "[m]y own preference ... is to establish a uniform rate of interest by our law; but having been overruled on that
point, I prefer now to place the national banks in each state on precisely
the same footing with individuals and persons doing business in the state
by its laws." 42 Unfortunately, the final version of section 30, in which
the Exception Clause appeared for the first time, was introduced following an apparent off-the-record Senate conference, and it is unclear to
what extent, if at all, Senator Sherman's views may have been compro44
mised.43 No explanation of the Exception Clause was ever provided.
Perhaps in recognition of the fact that the legislative history offered
only an attenuated basis for interpretation of the Exception Clause, the
Tiffany opinion focused on an assessment of the statute's overall purpose:
It was expected that [national banks] would come into competition with State banks, and it was intended to give them at
least equal advantages in such competition. In order to accomplish this they were empowered to reserve interest at the same
rates, whatever those rates might be, which were allowed to
similar State institutions. This was considered indispensible
to protect them against possible unfriendly State legislation.
Obviously, if State statutes should allow their banks of issue a
rate of interest greater than the ordinary rate allowed to natural
persons, National banking associations could not compete with
them, unless allowed the same. On the other hand, if such
associations were restricted to the rates allowed by the statutes
of the State to banks which might be authorized by the State
laws, unfriendly legislation might make their existence in the
state impossible. A rate of interest might be prescribed so low
that banking could not be carried on except at a certain loss. 45
42. Id. at 2126 (statement of Sen. Sherman) (emphasis added). The debate
between the pro-national proponents (Sens. Sherman, Fessenden, and Trumbull)
and the pro-state faction (Sens. Grimes, Henderson, and Doolittle) was eventually narrowed to the question of whether "allowed" or "established" would
become the operative word in what is now the Allowance Clause. Id. at 2127-28.
It was apparently understood that use of the word "established" would have

urged a construction of the Allowance Clause under which national banks
were restricted to the "legal rate" of interest as in the Currency Act of 1863.
See id. at 2125 (statement of Sen. Grimes). For a discussion of the Currency
Act of 1863, see note 21 and accompanying text supra.
43. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 2127, 2145. If the Tiffany Court's
interpretation is correct, then it follows that Senator Sherman was able to

sustain his "preference" without any compromise, or at least without compromise discernible from the final version of § 30. See text accompanying
note 42 supra. For an argument that total victory for Senator Sherman and

his pro-national supporters would have been improbable, and that the interpretation adopted in Tiffany should therefore be rejected, see Comment, supra
note 37, at 1256-58.
44. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 2127, 2145.

45. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 412-13.
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This analysis has been criticized for suggesting that state legislatures
would irrationally prescribe interest rate ceilings for bank loans that
were so low as to drive out of operation all banking institutions in the
state.46 But even so characterized, the Court's hypothesis does not seem
outlandish in light of the historical perspective from which it was
written.4 7 In his opinion in Tiffany, Justice Strong observed that
"National banks have been National favorites" and that "much has been
done to insure their taking the place of State banks . . . [t]he latter
hav[ing] been substantially taxed out of existence." 48 By 1873, when
Tiffany was decided, conversion from state to national charters had led
to a precipitous decline in the vitality of state banking. 49 A prohibitive
tax had caused the virtual disappearance from circulation of bank notes
issued by state-chartered institutions, 50 and national banks outnumbered
state banks by more than seven to one. 51 When faced with the prospective "nationalization" of their locally chartered banking institutions, it
is not inconceivable that states would enact retaliatory usury laws so
52
that profitable loans could be made only by non-bank lenders.
C. The Post-Tiffany Period
Soon after Tiffany was decided, the Supreme Court's grim prognosis
for state-chartered banking 53 began to prove dramatically incorrect. As
a result of the unanticipated growth in the popularity of demand de46. See Comment, supra note 37, at 1259. The author observes that
"[s]etting interest rates at a level calculated to drive all banks out of business,
however, would seem to be a particularly unavailing means for state legislatures
to choose as a way of favoring their state banks." Id. (emphasis in original).
47. See notes 48-52 and accompanying text infra.
48. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 413. In referring to the favored status of national
banks, Justice Strong noted that national banks were established to provide a
uniform currency and create a market for loans to the federal government. Id.
This reference to "national favorites" has been erroneously associated with the
most favored lender doctrine. See notes 110-12 and accompanying text infra.
49. T.

ANDERSON,

FEDERAL AND

STATE

CONTROL OF BANKING

75-78 (1934).

See also Hackley, supra note 20, at 573. The author notes that the number of
state banks dropped from 1,492 in 1862 to 247 in 1868. Id.
50. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 6, 13 Stat. 484. The ten percent tax
had been increased from two percent so as to more effectively eliminate the
issuance of circulating bank notes by state-chartered banks. H. PROCHNOW,
AMERICAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 21 (1951).
A constitutional challenge to a
subsequent reenactment of the tax was unsuccessful. See Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869) (constitutionality of Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184,
§ 9, 14 Stat. 146, upheld as valid exercise of congressional taxation power).
51. G. ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION: A HISTORICAL
APPROACH 67 (1968).
Tiffany was decided at the approximate height of this
trend. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text infra.
52. See notes 45-51 and accompanying text supra.

53. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
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posits, most banks found themselves able to fund loans and investments
without relying on the issuance of bank notes. 54 The rate of conversions
to national charters dropped sharply, and state-chartered banking became revitalized. 55 By 1895 the number of state banks had increased
ten-fold and was running slightly ahead of the total for national banks.5 6
But despite the somewhat lowered profile of the "national favorites,"
there was never any direct challenge to the holding in Tiffany that
national banks could charge the highest rate available to lenders in
57
general or, if higher, the rate permitted for state banks of issue.
A few years after Tiffany, an issue arose in the lower federal courts
as to how the Exception Clause should be construed in the context of
the banking scheme in Pennsylvania. In First National Bank v.
Duncan,58 it was noted that certain Pennsylvania banks had been
specially authorized to charge interest at any rate agreed to by the borrower. 59 This special authority, however, was granted by the banks'
charters rather than by any statute of general application.6 0 The defendant borrowers argued that since there was no general law which
permitted state-chartered banks of issue to charge more than the rate
available to lenders in general, national banks should not be permitted
54. See Hackley, supra note 20, at 573.
55. See Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31
749, 755-56 (1966).
56. T. ANDERSON, supra note 49, at 85.

LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBs.

57. See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S.
299, 313 (1978). In Marquette, the Supreme Court cited the Tiffany opinion:
"§ 30 and its descendants have been interpreted for over a century to give
advantages to national banks over their State competitors." Id. at 314, quoting
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 413. For a further discussion of Marquette, see notes
178-87 and accompanying text infra. Nearly sixty years prior to Marquette,
three dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court had adopted the precise interpretation of § 30 that was expressly rejected in Tiffany. See Evans v. National
Bank, 251 U.S. 108, 117-18 (1919) (Pitney, J., dissenting). In his dissenting
opinion, in which he was joined by Justices Brandeis and Clarke, Justice

Pitney stated:
[T]he purpose of Congress was to place national banks upon a precise
equality in this respect with banks of issue organized under state
laws, and that where local law places a higher or lower limit upon
such banks of issue than upon other lenders of money the same limit
should be imposed upon national banks.
Id. (Pitney, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the holding
in Tiffany to the contrary, see notes 31-52 and accompanying text supra. It
should be noted that the quotation from Evans would have been dictum even
if it had appeared in the majority opinion, since no issue had been raised as
to whether the usury ceiling in question applied solely to state banks or to
lenders in general. See Evans, supra, at 112. There was an uncontroverted
allegation that the loans involved, if usurious under state law, would have been
usurious if made by either an individual or a state bank. Id.

58. 9 F. Cas. 91 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1878) (No. 4,804).
59. Id. at 92.

60. Id.
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agreed to by their borrowers. 6'
Justice, quoted extensively from
jected the defendants' argument
as follows:

1087

in Pennsylvania to charge any rate
Justice Strong, sitting as a Circuit
his opinion in Tiffany, and flatly reby explicating the Exception Clause

[The Exception Clause] declares that where, by the laws of any
state, a rate of interest different from the general rate shall be
limited, or allowed, for state banks of issue, national banks shall
be allowed the same. It says not a word of allowance to the
banks by general law. Charters offered by special law, granting
special privileges to those who accept the offer, are as clearly
62
laws of the state as are the most general enactments.
Less than five months after Duncan was decided, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania was presented with a factually similar case in First
National Bank v. Gruber.63 Although the court unanimously decided
the narrow evidentiary issue before it,64 Chief Justice Agnew wrote a
lengthy and strongly worded concurring opinion in which he disagreed
with the Duncan court's liberal application of the Exception Clause.6
He criticized Duncan on technical grounds, 66 and because it accentuated
unnecessarily the competitive advantage enjoyed by national banks under
Tiffany.6 7 It should be noted, however, that Chief Justice Agnew
stopped short of taking issue with Tiffany's interpretation of section 30.68
61. Id.
62. Id. at 93.

Under Justice Strong's characterization, although the bank-

ing charters themselves were special charters, they were issued upon acceptance
of the conditions of a general offer. Id. Justice Strong noted that if the
borrowers' argument were accepted, states would be able to confer powers upon
their own banks that were unavailable to national banks. Id.
63. 87 Pa. 468 (1878).
64. Id. at 468-70. The court held that it was not bound to take judicial
notice of the existence of specially chartered banks unless their charters were
produced and proven. Id. at 470.
65. Id. at 470-76 (Agnew, C.J., concurring).

66. Id. at 474 (Agnew, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice noted that
the state banks in question were not within the Exception Clause because,
having been authorized to do business under special charter, they were not
organized under the "laws" of the state. Id. He also noted that a bank
permitted to charge any rate agreed to by the borrower was not subject to a
rate that was "limited" for state banks. Id.
67. Id. at 475-76 (Agnew, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice commented:
Congress did not intend to place [national banks] on a vantage
ground over the state banks. To say that all national banks in a
state can adopt an exceptional rate allowed to a single bank in a
state, or even two or three, is to place them above the state banks
as a class . . . .
Id. at 476.
68. See generally id. at 470-76.
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D. The Impact on the Exception Clause of the
Banking Act of 1933

In 1933, the Allowance Clause was amended to incorporate a federal
alternative rate of one percent in excess of the discount rate.6 9 The
purpose of this additional provision was to preserve the economic viability of the discounting process 70 during periods when the federal
reserve discount rate approximated or exceeded the state usury ceiling
otherwise applicable under section 85. 7 1 Concurrently with the addition
of the federal rate in the Allowance Clause, the Exception Clause was
amended to delete the words "of issue." 72 While no explanation for
this deletion appears in the legislative history of the Banking Act of
1933, 7 3 it seems likely that it was merely a cosmetic change in recognition of the fact that state banks no longer issued circulating bank
notes. 74 Nevertheless, the meaning of the statute was undeniably
changed. While under the prior version of the Exception Clause, courts
had little difficulty discerning what was intended by the term "banks of
issue," 75 the more general reference to "banks" left room for interpretation.
An illustration of this problem appears in the federal district court
opinion in United States v. Palmer.7 6 The court took the position that
the amended Exception Clause did not necessarily apply to any institution that was called a bank. 77 In concluding that a national bank
69. See Act of June 16, 1933, supra note 24.
70. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. The process by which a
member bank "discounts" its customers' notes at the Federal Reserve Bank is
the functional equivalent of pledging the notes as collateral for a loan or
advance which bears interest at the Federal Reserve discount rate. See id.;
12 C.F.R. § 201.4 (1981).
71. See Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems:
Hearings Bef. a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,

71st Cong., 3d Sess., 507-08 (1931) (statement of Sen. Glass).

If the Federal

Reserve discount rate were higher than the maximum lawful rate of interest
on the underlying customer notes, utilization of the discounting process would
necessarily result in an incremental loss to the member bank. See id.; note
70 supra.
72. Act of June 16, 1933, supra note 24.
73. See S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1933); H.R.
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933).

REP.

No. 150,

74. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
75. See notes 58-68 and accompanying text supra.
76. 28 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). The United States, as assignee
through the Federal Housing Administrator, argued that a note taken by a
national bank was not usurious under the Exception Clause. Id. at 937-38.
77. Id. The court made no reference to the original version of the Exception Clause. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss5/10

12

Bornstein: Extension of the Most Favored Lender Doctrine under Federal Usury

1981-82]

COMMENT

1089

located in New York was not entitled to charge the same rate of interest
as an "industrial bank," 78 the court determined that the Exception
Clause applied only to banks and trust companies whose powers were
derived from the state's general banking laws.7 9 The court's reasoning
was that industrial banks were not "banks" in either the "common acceptance of the term" or within the meaning of the Exception Clause.8 0
After noting that Tiffany referred specifically to interest rate parity between national banks and "similar state institutions," the Palmer court
opined that commercial and industrial banks were not "similar." 81

E. The Comptroller's Interpretive Rulings
In the 1948 edition of its Digest of Legal Opinions,8 2 the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency issued an interpretation of section 85
which squarely rejects the Palmer court's construction of the Exception
Clause.88 In paragraph 9510 of the Digest, the Comptroller stated that
national banks were entitled to the same interest rate privileges as "any
competing state banking institution," observing that both commercial
and industrial banks were "banking institutions." 84 In 1960, the lan78. An industrial bank or morris plan company is a privately owned
organization which makes personal loans to wage earners and obtains financing
from the public in the form of interest-bearing investment certificates. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 910 (rev. 5th ed. 1979); 1 CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
(CCH) 560 (Mar. 3, 1982).
79. 28 F. Supp. at 938.
80. Id. at 937-38.
81. Id. at 938, quoting Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 412-13
(1873). For the text of the pertinent portion of the Tiffany opinion, see text
accompanying note 45 supra.
82. Comptroller of the Currency, Digest of Legal Opinions (1948).
83. Id. at 9510. For a discussion of Palmer, see notes 76-81 and accompanying text supra.
84. Comptroller of the Currency, Digest of Legal Opinions at
9510
(1948) (emphasis in original). The full text is as follows:
9510. Charging interest at highest rates permitted to competing
institutions
R.S. 5197 (12 U.S.C. 85) limits the interest which a national bank
may charge to "the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the
bank is located . 'i. , except that where by the laws of any State a
different rate is limited for banks organized under State laws," national
banks located in that State may also charge such higher rate.
In enacting R.S. 5197, Congress intended that, with respect to
interest charges, national banks shall have the same powers as any
competing State banking institution. State commercial banks and
industrial banks both constitute competing elements among banking
institutions. Therefore, national banks are empowered to charge
interest at the maximum rate permitted by State law to either State
commercial banks' or industrial banks. Where State law permits a.
higher-than-ordinary interest rate on specified classes of loans (for
example, small loans), a national bank which makes loans at such
special rate is subject to all limitations of substance with respect to
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guage of paragraph 9510 was amended to accord interest rate parity
with any "competing lending institution." 85 In 1966, the opinion was
reworded to permit charging interest at the highest rate allowed to any
competing state-chartered or licensed lending institution, whether or not
the national bank was licensed under state law.86 The 1966 text was
promulgated as an interpretive ruling in 1971 87 and has remained unchanged since its codification in 1972.88 The Comptroller's ruling now
reads as follows:
A national bank may charge interest at the maximum rate
permitted by State law to any competing State chartered or
licensed lending institution. If State law permits a higher interest rate on a specified class of loans, a national bank making
such loans at such higher rate is subject to the provisions of
State law relating to such class loans that are material to the
determination of the interest rate. For example, a national
size, maturity of the loan, and the like, which are prescribed by the
State statute authorizing the higher rate.
Id. (emphasis in original). The opinion implicitly reasons that if commercial
and industrial banks compete with each other in making similar types of
loans, they should be given the same status for purposes of the Exception
Clause.

See id.

85. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 2 COMPTROLLER'S
INTERPRETIVE RULINGS: CHANGES IN TEXT, 1948-77 [hereinafter cited as CHANGES
IN TEXT]
7310, 9510 (undated publication; no uniform pagination). The
chronology of changes through 1965 is as follows:
(a) When the Digest was reprinted in 1960, the word "banking," which
appears twice in the 1948 version of
9510, was changed to "lending." Id.
at 9510. For the text of the 1948 version of 9510, see note 84 supra.
(b) In June, 1963,
9510 was deleted and replaced by
7310, which

carried the identical title and read as follows:

A National Bank may charge interest at the maximum rate permitted by applicable state law to any competing state lending
institution, including industrial banks. Where state law permits a
higher than ordinary interest rate on specified classes of loans (for
example, small loans), a National Bank which makes loans at such
special rate is subject to all the limitations of substance with respect
to such factors as size, maturity, and the like, prescribed by the state
statute authorizing the higher rate.

Id. at

7310.

(c) In June, 1964, reference to industrial banks was eliminated and the
"all limitations of substance" wording was replaced by "only to such limitations relating to the class of loans as are material to the determination of the
rate of interest." Id. See also UNITED STATES COMPTROLLFR OF THE CURRENCY,
MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS, ch. VI,
7310 (1964).

86. CHANGES IN TEXT, supra note 85, at 7310. For the text of the 1966
version as currently codified, see text accompanying note 89 infra.
87. 36 Fed. Reg. 17,015 (Aug. 26, 1971).
88.
(1982).

CHANGES

IN TEXT,

supra note 85, at
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bank may lawfully charge the highest rate permitted to be
charged by a State-licensed small loan company or morris plan
bank, without being so licensed.89
Within two years of its promulgation, the Comptroller's ruling
successfully withstood challenges to its validity in both federal and state
courts.90 In Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union National Bank and
Trust Co.j 91 the Sixth Circuit held that national banks in Michigan
could charge their borrowers for closing costs on mortgage loans, notwithstanding the fact that the right to assess such costs *was exclusively
reserved to savings and loan associations under applicable Michigan
statutes. 92 The court deferred to the reasonableness of the Comptroller's
ruling and the legislative history of section 85.0 3
In Commissioner of Small Loans v. First National Bank, 94 the Court
of Appeals of Maryland held that national banks which made cash advances to their credit card customers could charge interest at the advantageous rate provided in the state's small loan act, even though all banks
were statutorily barred from becoming licensees under the act.9 5 The
court observed that since Congress had not amended section 85 in response to the Comptroller's ruling, congressional acquiescence therein
89. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1982).

The substance of the 1971 ruling, insofar

as it relates to the effect of state licensing statutes, was apparently foreshadowed as early as 1936. See Interpretive Letter from J.F.T. O'Connor,
Comptroller of the Currency (May 2, 1936). In that letter the Comptroller
cautiously opined that national banks located in Iowa could charge rates
authorized by the state's small loan statute, notwithstanding the statute's
prohibition against licensing of banks. Id. For a discussion of the importance

of the licensing aspect of the Comptroller's ruling, see notes 168-77 and
accompanying text infra. Twenty years after Mr. O'Connor's interpretive
letter, an unequivocal opinion to the same effect was issued. See Interpretive
Letter from W.M. Taylor, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency (April 11,
1956). See also Interpretive Letter from James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the
Currency (Sept. 20, 1965) noted in 44 TEX. L. REV. 547 (1966).
90. See notes 91-97 and accompanying text infra.
91. 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972).

In Northway Lanes, the United States

filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the Comptroller's ruling and its
application in that case. Id. at 855-56.
92. Id. at 863.

The court also held that under Evans v. National Bank,

a national bank's right to take interest in advance arises under federal law
and is therefore independent of state-imposed restrictions. 464 F.2d at 860-61,
citing Evans v. National Bank, 251 U.S. 108 (1919). This aspect of the court's
holding has generally been criticized. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin,
509 F.2d 872, 878-79 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Herstein, Michigan Usury Law,
27 WAYNE L. REV. 435, 478-86 (1981).
93. 464 F.2d at 864. The Sixth Circuit noted that a reasonable interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to
judicial deference. Id., citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 7 (1965).
94. 268 Md. 305, 300 A.2d 685 (1973).
95. Id. at 315, 300 A.2d at 690.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 5 [1982], Art. 10

1092

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27: p. 1077

could be inferred. 96 The Commissioner opinion also noted that national
banks have long been considered inherently immune from state interference with their functions as "federal instrumentalities." 97
Several cases decided after Northway Lanes have focused on the
application of the most favored lender doctrine after presuming or confirming the validity of the Comptroller's ruling.9 S Most of the recent
controVersies have arisen in the context of credit card transactions and
have centered on construction of the phrases "a specified class of loans"
and "the provisions of state law ...

that are material to the determina-

tion of the interest rate," as those phrases appear in the Comptroller's
ruling.99

III.

ANALYSIS OF THE COMPTROLLER'S RULING

A. Consistency With Tiffany's Underlying Policy
The Comptroller's ruling has been criticized on the grounds that it
interferes with the states' power to establish their own usury ceilings
and that it results in a competitive advantage for national banks over
their state-chartered competitors. 10 0 While these observations are ana96. Id. at 315, 300 A.2d at 690-91, citing Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young,
309 U.S. 517, 524-25 (1940); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co.,
287 U.S. 77, 84 (1932).
97. 268 Md. at 317, 300 A.2d at 691-92.

The Maryland court quoted the

Supreme Court as follows:
National banks are instrumentalities of the Federal government,
created for a public purpose, and as such necessarily subject to the
paramount authority of the United States. It follows that an attempt
by a state to define their duties or control the conduct of their affairs
is absolutely void, wherever such attempted exercise of authority expressly conflicts with the laws of the United States, and . . . frustrates

the purpose of the national legislation ....

Id., quoting Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896).

For additional discussion of the "federal instrumentality doctrine," see note 105 and
accompanying text infra.
98. See Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d 255, 259-60 (8th
Cir. 1977) (credit cards); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 538 F.2d 1284,

1290 (7th Cir. 1976) (credit cards); First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872,
880 (8th Cir. 1975) (installment notes); Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 467 F.2d

167, 174 (5th Cir. 1972) (credit cards); Ray v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust

Co., 443 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (installment loans); United Mo.
Bank v. Danforth, 394 F. Supp. 774, 779 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (credit cards).
99. See note 98 supra. For thorough analyses of problems associated with
application of the most favored lender doctrine, see Arnold & Rohner, The
"Most Favored Lender" Doctrine for Federally Insured Financial InstitutionsWhat Are Its Boundaries?, 31 CATH. U.L. REv. 1, 18-30 (1981); Burke & Kaplinsky, Unraveling the New Federal Usury Law, 37 Bus. LAw. 1079, 1100-04 (1982).
The Comptroller has generally insisted on strict compliance with substantive,
rate-related state law provisions. See generally id. See, e.g., OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 178, 5 CONSUMER CiED. GUIDE (CCH) 97,239 (Mar. 3, 1981).
100. See Comment, supra note 37, at 1267. In Commissioner of Small
Loans v. First Nat'l Bank, 268 Md. 305, 300 A.2d 685 (1973), it was argued that:
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lytically correct, it should be recognized that the ruling leads to such
results only where a state has statutorily created its own privileged class
of lender in the first instance.' 0 ' For example, in the unique situation
which exists in Arkansas-where all lenders are limited by that state's
constitution to an interest rate ceiling of ten percent-there are no
"favored lenders" at all, and the Comptroller's ruling will not permit
national banks to charge more than ten percent. 02 The ruling is similarly inoperative under any statutory scheme in which the usury laws
are functionally classified, i.e. differentiated solely with respect to their
characteristics as loans and without considering the identity or legal
status of the lender. 03 It is only where the state has itself established a
special class of "favored" lender that the Comptroller's ruling will
peremptorily allow a national bank to share the privilege and obtain an
04
interest rate advantage that may be unavailable to certain competitors.
And where the federal advantage does become a factor, the result can be
justified on the basis of Tiffany's caveat that national banks must be
protected against unfriendly state legislation. 05
[t]he banks with their competitive advantage as to accessibility to the
consumer will leave only the poorest credit risks for the small loan
licensees, people which [sic] might have obtained a loan from the
license [sic] if they constituted a small percent of the licensee's business
but who cannot obtain a loan if they are its exclusive customers.
Id. at 315-16, 300 A.2d at 691 (quoting appellants' argument).
101. See, e.g., United Mo. Bank v. Danforth, 394 F. Supp. 774, 783-84
(W.D. Mo. 1975). In Danforth, it was held that Missouri's credit sales act,
which mandated a relatively low interest rate for all retail credit sales, would
have applied to national banks making such extensions of credit, were it not
for the fact that the state's small loan companies were definitionally excluded
from coverage under the statute. Id. at 784. Because of the single exclusion
from the restrictive rate ceiling of the credit sales act, a "favored" lender was
created, and national banks were therefore entitled to avail themselves of the
exclusion as well. Id. at 784-85.
102. See First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872, 875 8c n.4 (1975), citing
ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13. Other usury law preemptions may still be available
to lenders in Arkansas under federal law. See notes 3-8 and accompanying
text supra.
103. See note 101 and accompanying text supra. In Danforth, had there
been no exemption under the credit sales act for small loan companies, no
lender would have been favored with respect to the "specified class of loan"
(retail credit sales) covered by that statute. See id.; 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1982).
Courts have not always recognized this aspect of the Comptroller's ruling. See
Equitable Trust Co. v. Sachs, A-60063/120-1/Fol. 713 at 37-38 (Cir. Ct. of
Baltimore City, Md., Jan. 28, 1981), appeal argued, No. 128, Sept. Term, 1981
(Ct. App. Md. May 6, 1982).
104. See notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra.
105. See note 45 and accompanying text supra. Were it not for the most
favored lender doctrine, an extremely "unfriendly" state could theoretically
create a special class of non-bank licensees, and then enact a statute to reserve
exclusively for such licensees the authority to make profitable loans in any given
category. See id. This entitlement to protection against adverse state legislation has traditionally been accorded national banks on the basis of their status
as "federal instrumentalities" and is grounded in the supremacy clause. See
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B. Technical Inconsistency With the Statutory Language
Some courts have overstated the relationship between Tiffany and
the Comptroller's ruling by suggesting that the most favored lender
doctrine is directly attributable to Tiffany's construction of section 30.106
07
More than a century after Tiffany, in First National Bank v. Nowlin,
the district court stated: "As this court construes Tiffany .

.

. the pur-

pose of section 85 is to put a national bank as far as interest is concerned
in as good a position as the most favored lender operating in the state
where the bank is located." 108 This quotation is particularly significant
because it is the first judicial usage of the "most favored lender" terminology and because the Comptroller's ruling, which had been promulgated three years earlier, was not mentioned in the opinion. 109
A few years after Nowlin, the Eighth Circuit stated even more
directly that "[t]his 'most favored lender' doctrine was recognized by the
Supreme Court in [Tiffany]." 110 And in the Marquette opinion in
1978, the Supreme Court itself noted in dictum that "[t]he 'most favored
lender' status for national banks under Tiffany has since been incorporated into the regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency." .11
Rohner, Problems of Federalism in the Regulation of Consumer Financial
Services Offered by Commercial Banks: Part 1, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 32-34
(1979), citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Wille, State Banking: A Study in Dual
Regulation, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 733, 742-43 (1966), citing McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The "federal instrumentality"
doctrine has been held to exempt national banks from state law which conflicts
with the provisions of a federal statute, frustrates its purposes, or impairs the
bank's function as an instrumentality of the federal government. Franklin
Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375-78 (1954); Farmer's & Mechanic's
Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1875). See also note 97 and accompanying text supra. In the context of our modern banking system, judicial
application of this doctrine to national banks exclusively has been cogently
criticized. See note 218 and accompanying text infra.
106. See notes 107-25 and accompanying text infra.
107. 374 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. Ark. 1974), aff'd, 509 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975).
The controversy in Nowlin was resolved against a national bank that had attempted to apply a nominally lawful interest rate on a consumer discount basis

and thereby obtain an effective yield that would be usurious under state law.
Id.
108. Id. at 1041.

109. Id. at 1037-41. No opinion predating Judge Henley's opinion in
Nowlin utilizes the phrase "most favored lender." See cases cited at note 98
supra. See also Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972); Commissioner of Small Loans v. First Nat'l Bank,
268 Md. 305, 300 A.2d 685 (1973). For a discussion of Northway Lanes and
Commissioner, see notes 90-97 and accompanying text supra.
110. Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1977).
111. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
314 n.26 (1978). See note 112 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion
of the Marquette holding, see notes 178-87 and accompanying text infra.
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It is submitted, however, that Tiffany's commentary on section 30
cannot support the substance of the most favored lender doctrine without the essential link provided by the Comptroller's ruling. 1 2 There
is simply no language in Tiffany or in any judicial opinion prior to
Northway Lanes which suggests that national banks may charge the
highest rate available to any competing lender. 11 Tiffany unmistakably
describes the Allowance Clause as permitting interest at the rate allowed
for "lenders generally." 114 This is a reference to all lenders; it is not
equivalent to the maximum rate allowed to any category of lender."15
Only in reference to the Exception Clause does Tiffany discuss charging
interest at a rate that may be higher than the rate allowed for lenders
in general, and that is where a higher rate is provided for state-chartered
banks.116
Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history of section 30
which can reasonably be viewed as incorporating the most favored lender
doctrine into Tiffany's construction of the statute. 17 During the Senate
debates, there was an unsuccessful attempt to limit the Allowance Clause
so as to permit no rate in excess of the state's "legal rate"-the maximum
rat6 available in the absence of special statute."l 8 It was noted that in
some states an exemption from the legal rate was available to all lenders
where the interest rate was expressed in a written contract, and it was
ultimately decided that this exemption should be available to national
112. For a discussion of the Tiffany opinion, see notes 31-38 &c45-52 and
accompanying text supra. In Marquette, the Court was attempting to draw a
linguistic connection between the "National favorites" quotation from Tiffany
and the most favored lender doctrine, ostensibly to illustrate that national banks
are still considered national favorites by the federal agency primarily responsible
for their supervision. See 439 U.S. 299, 314 & n.26 (1978). The verbal nexus
is specious, because the most favored lender doctrine refers not to national
banks as favorites under federal law, but to the favored status of competing
lenders under state law. See notes 82-99 and accompanying text supra.
113. See notes 31-81 and accompanying text supra. Commentators have
generally avoided direct attribution of the most favored lender doctrine to
Tiffany. See Arnold c Rohner, supra note 99, at 6 &cn.14 (most favored lender
terminology "grew from language in Tiffany"); Burke 8c Kaplinsky, supra note
99, at 1096 ("Tiffany left unanswered" the question of how § 85 applies to
special classes of non-bank lenders).
114. See Tiffany v. National Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 411-12 (1873).
For a discussion of the "lenders generally" terminology, see notes 34-38 and
accompanying text supra.
115. See notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 45-52 and accompanying text supra. In discussing the Exception Clause, the Court stated that national banks "were empowered to reserve interest at the same rates, whatever those rates might be, which were
allowed to similar state institutions." Tiffany v. National Bank, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 409, 412 (1873).
117. See notes 118-20 and accompanying text infra.
118. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 2123-26 (remarks of Sens. Grimes,
Doolittle and Henderson).
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banks under the Allowance Clause. 119 There is no mention whatever
of an interest rate that might be available to any special category of
20
lenders, other than as delineated in the Exception Clause.
The opinion in Commissioner addressed the disparity between
Tiffany and the Comptroller's ruling by making the following observation:
[We have carefully considered, but find no merit in appellants'
argument that the provisions of § 85 must be construed so as to
limit national banks to charging rates of interest allowed, in
the language of Tiffany, to "state banks" or "lenders generally."
This argument, based on their restricted reading of Tiffany,
overlooks the factual context of that case which made "state
banks" and "lenders generally" the only categories considered.' 21
The discrepancy is more fundamental than the quotation from Commissioner indicates. Not only were "state banks" and "lenders generally"
the only categories considered in Tiffany, they were the only categories
considered when section 30 was drafted 122 and the only categories con123
sidered in the state laws to which the Allowance Clause referred.
The Commissioner court thus implicitly theorized that if special interest
rate privileges had been accorded certain categories of non-bank lenders
at the time Tiffany was decided, then Tiffany would have expressly
embraced the most favored lender doctrine. 2 4 The theory may well be
a reasonable one, but it is based on extrapolation of Tiffany's under25
lying policy rather than interpretation of statutory language.
119. Id. Senator Sherman spoke of granting national banks the same
interest rate privileges as "other associations and individuals." CONG. GLOBE,
supra note 22, at 2126 (emphasis added). See also Marquette Nat'l Bank v.
First of Omaha Serv. Corp., where the Court referred to the Allowance Clause
as permitting the rate allowed "for lenders generally." 439 U.S. 299, 308 n.19
(1978).
120. See notes 45-52 and accompanying text supra.
121. Commissioner of Small Loans v. First Nat'l Bank, 268 Md. 305, 315,
300 A.2d 685, 690 (1973).
122. See notes 118-20 and accompanying text supra.
123. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 2123-26. The debates touched on
the usury laws of California, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Pennsylvania and

Wisconsin. See id.

124. See note 121 and accompanying text supra. It has been noted that
at that time, the type of finance company which tends to find itself a "favored
lender" under modern state laws simply did not exist. See G. ROBERTSON,
supra note 51, at 144-46.

125. See note 45 and accompanying text supra. The court in Commissioner viewed Maryland's exclusive licensing statute as the kind of "unfriendly
State legislation" that Tiffany saw as a threat to national banks. See id.; notes
121-24 and accompanying text supra. In Commissioner, however, the competitive advantage had been granted to a particular category of non-bank lenders,
rather than to non-bank lenders in general as in Tiffany. See notes 34-44,

112-24 and accompanying text supra.
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The fact that the Comptroller's ruling is only partly grounded in
the words of the statute probably explains the lack of consensus as to
which clause in section 85 it was intended to interpret. In the 1948
version of paragraph 9510, it appears that the opinion was intended to
interpret the Exception Clause by construing the term "bank" to include
both commercial and industrial banks. 126 But as the Comptroller's
definition of a "competing institution" became increasingly more inclusive, the ruling could no longer be associated solely with the Exception Clause. 127 In Northway Lanes, after the current version of the
ruling had been formulated, the Comptroller successfully argued in a
brief amicus curiae that the ruling was an interpretation of the Allowance Clause. 128 However, five years later in Fisher v. First National
126. See notes 84-85 and accompanying text supra. While both the 1948
and 1960 versions of 9510 quote both the Allowance and Exception Clauses,
they discuss only the Exception Clause. See CHANGES IN T xT, supra note 85,
at
9510. See also Interpretive Letter from A.J. Mulroney, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency (Feb. 7, 1941) ("the phrase 'banks organized under
state laws' [in § 85] includes both commercial and industrial banks"). For a
description of an industrial bank, see note 78 supra.
The conclusion that 9510 was intended to interpret the Exception Clause
exclusively is fortified by a discussion of the Allowance Clause which appears
in another paragraph of the Digest. See Comptroller of the Currency, Digest
of Legal Opinions 9520 (1948). This opinion entitled "Charging additional
fee for credit reports or investigation of borrower," contains the following
paragraph:
Under [§ 85], a national bank is permitted to charge the interest
rate allowed by the laws of the state where it is located. Many states
have statutes which permit an increased rate of interest on small
loans. National banks may charge this increased rate of interest on
such loans, but if they do, they are subject to the limitations of the
small loan law with respect to fees or other additional charges.
Id. This appears to refer only to statutes which permit an increased rate on
small loans made by any lender, i.e. by "lenders generally," since it does not
invoke a most favored lender concept by either its language or its context.
See id. Furthermore, if the Comptroller's interpretation of the Allowance
Clause had been considered integral to the most favored lender doctrine, the
foregoing quotation would have been included in
9510. See CHANGES IN
TEXT, supra note 85, at 9510; note 84 and accompanying text supra.
127. For a chronology of the changes in the Comptroller's ruling, see
notes 82-89 and accompanying text supra.
128. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Northway
Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 464 F.2d at 862. The court
adopted the Comptroller's argument by concluding that the Allowance Clause
was not "limited to a state's general usury rate, but was meant to include any
exceptions to that rate established for special transactions or special classes of
lenders." For an argument that the reference to "special transactions" is
within Tiffany's construction of the Allowance Clause but the reference to
"special classes of lenders" is not, see notes 112-25 and accompanying text
supra. For a general discussion of the controversy in Northway Lanes, see
notes 91-93 and accompanying text supra.
The notion that the most favored lender doctrine is an interpretation of
the Allowance Clause specifically may be partly attributable to the language of
the following unofficial headnote which precedes the district court opinion in
First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin:
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Bank of Chicago,19 the Seventh Circuit noted that "[t]he courts have
interpreted the allowance clause and the exception [clause] together to
permit national banking associations to charge the highest rate charged
by any person or entity in the state under like conditions." 130
Apart from its failure to attract broad subscription in the courts,
the proposition that the most favored lender concept is embodied within
the Allowance Clause cannot withstand examination under ordinary
principles of statutory construction. 311 If the Allowance Clause is construed to fully contain an authorization to charge the highest rate permitted to any competing lender, then the Exception Clause, which
permits the rate allowed for state banks (a special class of competing
lender) is superfluous. 18 2 It is generally recognized, however, that a
Purpose of provision of National Bank Act authorizing bank to
receive interest at rate allowed by laws of state where bank is located

is to put a national bank, as far as interest is concerned in as good a
position as the most favored lender operating in the state in which the

bank is located.
First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 374 F. Supp. 1037, 1037 (headnote no. 4) (E.D.
Ark. 1974). A headnote to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion in
Nowlin contains substantially identical wording. See First Nat'l Bank v.
Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872, 873 (headnote no. 6) (8th Cir. 1975). However, the
corresponding portions of the court opinions themselves refer not to the
Allowance Clause as indicated in the headnotes, but to § 85 in general. See
First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 374 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (E.D. Ark. 1974), aff'd,
509 F.2d 872, 880 (8th Cir. 1975).
129. 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976).
130. Id. at 1290 (citations omitted).
131. See notes 132-33 and accompanying text infra.
132. See note 128 and accompanying text supra. The Exception Clause
would be redundant with the Allowance Clause unless, during the period when
§ 30 was enacted and Tiffany was decided, a bank could have been "located"
(under the Allowance Clause) in one jurisdiction, while being "organized or
existing" (under the Exception Clause) in another. For the text of the two
clauses, see text accompanying notes 27 & 29 supra.
The Supreme Court has concluded that Congress, in enacting § 30, proceeded on the assumption that a national bank would be located where it was
organized. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
310 (1978), citing CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 2123-27. In dicta, three Circuit Courts of Appeals have attempted to distinguish "located" from "existing"
by suggesting that a national bank can be "existing" under the Exception Clause
in any state in which it is extending credit. See FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp.,
656 F.2d 139, 149-50 n.18 (5th Cir. 1981); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha,
548 F.2d 255, 257-58 (8th Cir. 1977); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago,
538 F.2d 1284, 1290-91 & nn.ll & 12 (7th Cir. 1976). The dicta are clearly
erroneous, because in order to come within the ambit of the Exception Clause,
the bank must be "organized or existing ... under this chapter." See note 29
and accompanying text supra. This obvious reference to "existence" in a
strictly statutory sense was apparently overlooked by the Seventh Circuit, which
cited the ordinary meaning of the word. See Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of
Chicago, 538 F.2d at 1291 n.12. The subsequent Fifth and Eighth Circuit
opinions simply state their agreement with the Seventh Circuit and would
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statute should be construed so as to give effect to each clause, and not
in such a way as to render any of its provisions meaningless or insig33
nificant.1
In summary, it may be said that the relationship between the
Comptroller's ruling and the language and legislative history of section
134
It seems clear that the courts have adopted
85 is an attenuated one.
inconsistencies in the formulation of
technical
toward
attitude
a benign
to
effectuate the policy of protecting
in
order
ruling
the Comptroller's
legislation, which was perceived
state
national banks against antagonistic
of
the statute.13 5
by Tiffany as the underlying purpose

IV.

EXTENSION OF THE MOST FAVORED LENDER DOCTRINE
UNDER

DIDAMCA

A. The Statutory Language
Sections 521 to 523 of DIDAMCA provide for a limited preemption
of state usury laws for state-chartered federally insured banks (section
1 7
521),13 6 federally insured savings and loan associations (section 522), 3
apparently follow the same rationale. See FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656
F.2d at 149-50 n.18; Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d at 257-58.
A more cogent explanation of the term "existing" as it appears in the Exception
Clause was provided by one of the litigants in the Supreme Court case consolidated with Marquette. See Brief for Petitioner at 31, Minnesota v. First of
Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). The State of Minnesota suggested that
the word "existing" was added to § 30 to account for the national banks that
were originally organized under state laws, but had converted to national
charters. See id.; note 24 supra. These converted state banks were "existing"
under the National Bank Act, but not "organized" under it. See Brief for
Petitioner, supra at 31. Except in this purely technical sense, the terms
"organized" and "existing" may therefore be considered synonymous with each
other and, for purposes of historical analysis, with the term "located" in the
Allowance Clause. See id.; Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv.
Corp., 439 U.S. at 310. For a discussion of the possibility that a distinction
between the terms "organized" and "located" might be appropriate in the
context of modern interstate lending transactions, see note 181 and accompanying text infra.
133. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979), citing United
States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955). See also 2A C. Sutherland,
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06 at 63 (4th ed. 1973).
134. See notes 82-133 and accompanying text supra.
135. See notes 45 & 105 and accompanying text supra.
136. See note 8 supra. Section 521 amends the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act by adding a new § 27 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (Supp. IV 1980)). See
note 140 and accompanying text infra.
137. See note 8 supra. Section 522 amends the National Housing Act by
adding a new § 414 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1730g (Supp. IV 1980)). See note
140 and accompanying text infra.
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and federally insured credit unions (section 523). 13 8 Except for a prefatory clause which appears only in section 521,19 the wording of these
sections is substantially identical and reads as follows (italicized wording
appears only in section 521):
(a) In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered
insured banks, including insured savings banks and insured
mutual savings banks, or insured branches of foreign banks
with respect to interest rates, if the applicable rate prescribed
in this subsection exceeds the rate [an insured institution]
would be permitted to charge in the absence of this subsection,
such [insured institution] may, notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for purposes of
this section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or
discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other
evidence of debt, interest at a rate of not more than 1 percentum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial
paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal
Reserve district where such [insured institution] is located or
at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, territory, or district
where the [insured institution] is located, whichever may be
140
greater.
It may be noted initially that the latter portion of sections 521 to 523
corresponds almost precisely with the wording of the Allowance Clause
in section 85.141 Based on a plain language reading, three preliminary
observations can be made as to how the preemptive provision operates.
First, the insured institution is permitted to charge a federal rate of one
percent over the federal reserve discount rate whenever it is advantageous to do so. 142 Second, the insured institution has available an
138. See note 8 supra. Section 523 amends the Federal Credit Union Act
by adding a new § 205g (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1785 (Supp. IV 1980)). See
note 140 and accompanying text infra.
139. For the text of the prefatory clause, see italicized wording in text
accompanying note 140 infra. The introductory clause reflects the fact that
the benefits of § 521 are already available to national banks under § 85. See
notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra.
140. See DIDAMCA, supra note 6, §§ 521-523. It must be recognized that
each section is subject to state override at any time, and the preemptive effect
of these sections must be so qualified. See DIDAMCA, supra note 6, § 525. As
of March 31, 1982, six states had overridden §§ 521-523. See note 8 supra.
141. For the text of § 85, see note 24 supra. Sections 521-523 reverse the
order in which the alternative federal rate appears and paraphrase the words
"and no more." Compare text accompanying note 140 supra with note 24
supra.
142. See text accompanying note 140 supra. The preemption operates
only when it provides a rate higher than the otherwise applicable rate. See id.
This, of course, is the only situation in which it would be of any help to the
lender. See id.
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additional preemptive alternative which is equal to "the rate allowed by
the laws of the State . . . where the [insured institution] is located." 143
And third, the additional alternative is available whenever it exceeds
both the federal rate and the rate that would be applicable in the
absence of the entire provision. 44 The question which cannot be immediately answered is how the alternative rate is determined, or more
specifically, what meaning was intended by the "rate allowed" wording.145
B. The Lack of Definitive Legislative History
The language of sections 521 to 523 is virtually identical to that of
companion bills introduced by the Arkansas delegations to the Senate
and House of Representatives on November 7, 1979 and February 13,
1980 respectively. 146 The statutory wording was adopted without either
of these bills actually being reported out of committee, 147 and despite
hearings on the Senate bill in December, 1979,148 the legislative history
is generally thought to be inconclusive on the meaning of the "rate
149
allowed" language.
There are a number of references in the Congressional Record to
the establishment of interest rate parity or competitive equality between
national banks and other insured lenders, but these comments appear to
refer only to the federal rate. 5 0 The uncertainty created by lack of a
succinct explanation of the "rate allowed" language is compounded by
the House Conference Report on the final version of DIDAMCA. 151
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. If §§ 521-523 are read quickly, the "rate allowed" language
appears to refer back to "the rate the institution would be permitted to charge
in the absence of this section." See id. The structure of the sentence, however, clearly indicates that this is not the case. See id.
146. See H.R. 6503, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H914 (daily ed.
Feb. 13, 1980) (introduced by Reps. Alexander, Anthony, Bethune and Hammerschmidt); S. 1988, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S16,118 (daily ed.
Nov. 7, 1979) (introduced by Sens. Bumpers and Pryor). The senators and
representatives who introduced these bills comprised the entire congressional
delegation from the State of Arkansas. [1979-1980] CONG. INDEX (CCH) 11,001,
25,301.

147. [1979-1980]

CONG. INDEX

(CCH) 21,026, 34,523.

148. Usury Lending Limits: Hearings on S. 1988 Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
149. See, e.g., Arnold & Rohner, supra note 99, at 4 n.10; Note, 36 Bus.
LAw. 1237, 1241-43 (1981).
150. See 126 CONG. REC. S3177 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980) (remarks of Sell.
Bumpers); 126 CONG. REC. S3170 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980) (remarks of Sen.
Proxmire); 126 CONG. Rc. H2274 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Reuss); 125 CONG. REc. S15,684-85 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1979) (remarks of Sens.
Bumpers and Pryor).
151. H.R. REp. No. 842, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 69, 78-79 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE, CONG. &AD. NEws 298, 308-09.
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That report describes the effect of sections 521 to 523 by stating that
"[s]tate usury ceilings ..

.

will be permanently preempted subject to the

right of affected states to override at any time and a ceiling of 1 percentage point above the appropriate Federal Reserve discount rate will
apply ... ,,152 This analysis deprives the "rate allowed" language of
any meaning at all by referring to the federal rate as a ceiling instead
of an alternative. 153 It simply cannot be reconciled with the statutory
wording which includes the phrase "whichever may be greater." 154
Either the House Conference Report is erroneous, or the "rate allowed"
language in each of the three sections must be considered meaningless. 155
C. Federal Agency Interpretations of Sections 521 to 523

Three federal regulatory agencies have discounted the House Conference Report and have separately issued interpretive opinions that the
"rate allowed" language accords most favored lender privileges to the
respective categories of insured depository institutions.150 These interpretations were issued within a few months of each other and within
thirteen months of DIDAMCA's effective date by the Federal Deposit
152. Id.
153. See id.

154. See id. The technical nature of many of DIDAMCA's provisions unavoidably led to a certain amount of confusion, as indicated by the following
remarks immediately following a discussion of the DIDAMCA's usury preemption provisions:
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 is one of the most complex and least understood pieces of
legislation that I have ever seen come before a legislative body. It has
been referred to as everything from a Christmas tree to a forest
primeval, the latter probably being the more appropriate phrase.
126 CONG. REc. S3180 (daily ed. March 27, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Stewart).
155. See id. Surprisingly, much of the commentary following the enactment of DIDAMCA apparently proceeded on the latter assumption. See, e.g.,
P.

SCHELLIE, MANAGER'S

GUIDE TO THE

1980

MONETARY

CONTROL

ACT

67-63

(1980); Weaver & O'Malley, supra note 6, at 111; Student Project, The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 14 AKRON
L. REV. 423, 500 (1981); Note, The Federal Monetary Control Act of 1980:
A Step Toward Deregulation of State Usury Laws, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 509,
525-26 (1981).
156. See notes 157-59 and accompanying text infra. Although none of the
agencies were granted specific rulemaking authority for §§ 521-523, these sections
are amendments to statutes under which the agencies exercise regulatory responsibility, and their interpretations are entitled to judicial respect commensurate
with their thoroughness and consistency and the validity of their reasoning.
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976), citing Skidmore v.
Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The agencies' interpretations must be distinguished, however, from rulings promulgated under express statutory authority.
See Mourning v. Family Pub. Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 367, 369 (1973). The latter
category of rulings have the force and effect of law and can be set aside only
if "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law." Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977).
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Insurance Corporation (FDIC),157 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB),6 8 and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).1 59
They essentially adopt the same rationale: because the "rate allowed"
language in sections 521 to 523 is virtually identical to the Allowance
Clause in section 85, Congress must have intended to reenact the Allowance Clause, along with the recognized interpretations thereof, for the
benefit of the insured institutions under DIDAMCA.lO 0 Each opinion
then cites Tiffany's construction of the Allowance Clause as the genesis
of the most favored lender doctrine, although discussion of the interpretive history of section 85 since Tiffany is presented in varying detail. 161

D. Analysis of the Agency Opinions
As noted in the earlier analysis of the Comptroller's ruling, it is
inconsistent with the language of section 85 to suggest that the substance
157. FDIC Interpretive Letter from Frank L. Skillern, Jr., General Counsel
(Jan. 30, 1981).
158. FHLBB Final Interpretative Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,987 (Feb. 25, 1981)
(to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §570.11).
159. NCUA Statement of Interpretation and Policy, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,153
(April 24, 1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 741), amending 45 Fed. Reg. 78,
624 (Nov. 26, 1980). The NCUA's original interpretation, which attempted to
reconcile the House Conference Report with the language of the statute, contained a "trigger mechanism" for the preemptive provisions, which commenters
and commentators found confusing and inconsistent with the statute. See
NCUA Statement, supra at 24,154; Note, supra note 149, at 1243 n.36.
160. See FDIC Interpretive Letter, supra note 157, at 4; FHLBB Final
Interpretative Rule, supra note 158, at 13,987-88; NCUA Statement of Interpretation and Policy, supra note 159, at 78,624.
The Attorney General of Michigan has issued an opinion which concurs in
the agencies' conclusions, but does not cite them. Opinion of the Michigan
Attorney General, No. 5894, May 1, 1981 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
BANKING L. REP. (CCH)
98,746.
In January, 1981, a Maryland trial court held that state-chartered banks
are entitled to most favored lender privileges under § 521. See Equitable Trust
Co. v. Sachs, No. A-60063/Fol. 713, slip op. at 35-37 (Cir. Ct. of Baltimore City,
Md., Jan. 28, 1981). The court's opinion concludes that § 521, because of the
similarity between its language and that of § 85, was intended to extend to
state banks the competitive advantages enjoyed by national banks. Id. The
decision has been appealed on other grounds. See note 103 supra.
161. See FDIC Interpretive Letter, supra note 157, at 3-4. The FDIC
seems to acknowledge that Tiflany is inadequate authority for the most favored
lender doctrine and cites Northway Lanes, Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha,
and the Comptroller's ruling. Id. The FDIC letter asserts that its conclusion
"is the only interpretation consistent with the Congressional intent to provide
parity for national and insured state banks." Id. at 4. But see notes 194-95
and accompanying text infra. The FHLBB Rule cites Tiffany and the Comptroller's ruling as the source of the most favored lender doctrine. See FHLBB
Interpretative Rule, supra note 158, at 13,988. The NCUA notes in its original
statement that the Supreme Court in Marquette had cited Tiffany as the source
of the most favored lender doctrine. See NCUA Statement of Interpretation
and Policy, supra note 159, at 78,625. See notes 110-11 and accompanying text
supra.
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of the most favored lender doctrine is contained within the Allowance
Clause, 62 and in any case, there exists no weight of authority to support
this contention. 163 But even assuming that the corresponding "rate
allowed" language in sections 521 to 523 can be said to embrace the
most favored lender doctrine, it seems unreasonable to conclude that
Congress chose to reenact the doctrine without any concrete indication
in the legislative history that it so intended. 64
162. See notes 131-33 and accompanying text supra.
163. See notes 126-30 and accompanying text supra. One commentator has
noted this inconsistency, but ultimately discounted it. See Bartlett, Savings
Associations and the New Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary

Control Act, 14 AKRON L. REV. 377, 182-83 (1981).
164. For a discussion of the legislative history of §§ 521-523, see notes 146-55
and accompanying text supra. In support of their most favored lender analyses,
two of the agencies have suggested expansive interpretations of certain remarks
in the Congressional Record. See FDIC Interpretive Letter, supra note 157, at
2. The FDIC quoted Senator Proxmire as making the general statement that
"[s]tate chartered depository institutions are given the benefits of 12 U.S.C. 85."
Id., citing 126 CONG. Ric. S3170 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980). The quoted sentence
is preceded, however, by a reference to § 85 which refers exclusively to the federal
rate of one percent over the discount rate. See 126 CONG. Rzc. 53170 (daily
ed. Mar. 27, 1980). The NCUA interpretation states that Senator Bumpers
"indicated that he supported the change [in the law under §§ 521-523] because
it would remove the competitive advantage national banks have by virtue of the
most favored lender status they enjoy under 12 U.S.C. 85." See NCUA Statement of Interpretation and Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 78,624 (1980), amended by 46
Fed. Reg. 24,153 (1981). Senator Bumpers' actual remarks were as follows:
Mr. President, I am pleased that the conference report includes a
provision permitting State-chartered insured banks, Federal- and Statechartered insured savings and loan associations, small business investment corporations, and Federal- and State-chartered insured credit
unions to charge 1 percent over the Federal Reserve discount rate-or
the rate permitted by State law if that is higher-on all loans, notwithstanding State usury statutes.
This provision is almost identical to legislation which Senator
Pryor and I introduced last year. It is similar to a provision found in
section 85 of title 12 of the United States Code which governs the rate
of interest that national banks may charge on loans, National banks
have been able to charge 1 percent over the Federal discount rate on
all loans since 1933. State banks and all savings and loans have been
at a distinct competitive disadvantage with national banks during this
period of exorbitant interest rates.
126 CONG. REc. S3177 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980). The FHLBB more conservatively observed that "the Congressional sponsors focused on the clause allowing
affected lenders to charge one percent above the Federal Reserve ninety-day
discount rate." See FHLBB Interpretative Rule, supra note 158, at 13,988.
Recent commentary supporting the agencies' interpretations of §§ 521-523
notes only a single direct reference to the most favored lender doctrine in the
legislative history of DIDAMCA. See Arnold & Rohner, supra note 99, at 4
n.10. In hearings on S. 1988, the bill that provided the wording ultimately
adopted in §§ 521-523, a representative of the Credit Union National Association
quoted the Comptroller's ruling and presented an example of the manner in
which it allows national banks to charge finance company interest rates. See
Hearings on S. 1988, supra note 148, at 64-65 (statement of Joseph N. Cugini,
Chairman Elect of the Credit Union National Ass'n and Chairman of the
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Furthermore, there is no apparent reason why sections 521 to 523
could not have been drafted to extend the most favored lender concept
by means of less esoteric statutory wording.'6 With only a few additional words, the "rate allowed" language could have read: "the highest
rate allowed to any competing lender under the laws of the state where
the [insured institution] is located." 166 Such a plain language formulation would not have conflicted with the structure of sections 521 to 523.167
Apart from the dubious statutory construction on which they are
based, the agencies' interpretations are rendered less persuasive by their
failure to uniformly preempt state licensing statutes in the same manner
as the Comptroller's ruling. 6 8 Where an insured institution invokes
one of the agencies' interpretations to charge a rate available under
state law to small loan companies exclusively, a question arises as to
whether the institution must comply with the licensing and procedural
requirements imposed by the state's small loan statute. Under the
Comptroller's ruling, it is clear that a national bank is not subject to
any non-substantive state-imposed licensing restrictions. 169 Under sections
521 to 523, however, while neither the FDIC nor the NCUA have
addressed this question17 0 the FHLBB has ruled that licensing and
procedural requirements are preempted only for federally chartered
savings and loan associations.' 71 Under the FHLBB ruling, "[t]he
Governmental Affairs Committee). However, Mr. Cugini's remarks indicate
he believed that § 523 would not fully establish parity between national banks
and credit unions, because § 523 would not allow credit unions to avail
themselves of most favored lender privileges. Id. Moreover, after his explanation of the most favored lender doctrine, Mr. Cugini made the following
remarks:
Mr. Chairman, credit unions are not asking that they be permitted

to charge the high rates charged by finance companies. However,
credit unions do need the right to charge rates which recognize the
realities of consumer credit and permit payment of realistic rates of

return on the savings of their members.
Id. at 65 (emphasis added). It thus appears that Mr. Cugini not only believed
that § 523 would not accord most favored lender privileges to credit unions,

but he was of the opinion that such privileges were not needed. Id. at 64-65.
165. See notes 126-30 and accompanying text supra.
166. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1982).

Alternatively, there might have been

a direct reference to the Comptroller's ruling. Id.
167. See notes 136-45 and accompanying text supra.
168. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.

169. For the text of the Comptroller's ruling, see text accompanying note
89 supra. See also notes 94-97 and accompanying text supra.
170. See FDIC Interpretive Letter, supra note 157; NCUA Statement of
Interpretation and Policy, supra note 159.
171. See FHLBB Interpretative Rule, supra note 158, at 13,988.
reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
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degree to which state-chartered insured institutions must comply with
such restrictions will be determined by their state supervisors." 171
Although sections 521 to 523 may arguably be read as preempting all
conflicting state law,173 the FHLBB apparently took the position that
it would be inappropriate to preempt state licensing and procedural
control over state-chartered insured institutions without a more definitive statutory authorization than is provided in section 522.174 If the
FHLBB's position is correct, it would apply also to the FDIC under
section 521 and to the NCUA under section 523.' 7 5 State-chartered
insured institutions would thus be subject to the cost and administrative
burden of complying with licensing and procedural regulations from
which their federally-chartered counterparts have been exempted.1, 6 It
is submitted that the competitive inequality thereby promoted is clearly
inconsistent with the express legislative intent of sections 521 to 523.'77
Federally-chartered insured institutions would not be required to
submit to state most-favored-lender restrictions that are primarily
procedural or regulatory in nature. Such restrictions would include
licensing, bonding, and reporting to state authorities. The degree to
which state-chartered institutions must comply with such restrictions
will be determined by their state supervisors.
Id.
172. Id. Under the FHLBB Rule, it is unclear what result obtains where
a most favored lender rate is available only to licensees under a state statute,
and the statute expressly prohibits licensing of state-chartered savings and loan
associations. See id.
173. See text accompanying note 140 supra. Sections 521-523 recite that
their provisions operate "notwithstanding any State constitution or statute,
which is hereby preempted for purposes of this section." DIDAMCA, supra
note 6, §§ 521-523.
174. See FHLBB Interpretative Rule, supra note 158, at 13,988. The
FHLBB notes that state authority over federally-chartered associations was preempted by the Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (Supp. IV 1980), but
it apparently could find no comparable preemption for state-chartered insured
associations under the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750g (Supp.
IV 1980). See FHLBB Interpretative Rule, supra note 158, at 13,988.
175. See id. There is no general preemption of state supervisory authority
over state-chartered insured institutions under either the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act or the Federal Credit Union Act. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832,
1751-1795i (Supp. IV 1980).
176. See notes 171-75 and accompanying text supra. The extent of this
regulatory burden is ironically determined by state agencies, whose control
over state usury ceilings has been preempted in the first instance. See id.
177. See note 150 and accompanying text supra. It is surprising that
more attention has not been focused on the anomaly of extending most favored
lender privileges in the absence of statutory avoidance power over state
licensing and procedural requirements, particularly since this issue was at the
core of the Comptroller's original 1936 opinion letter in this area, See Letter
from J.F.T. O'Connor, Comptroller, supra note 89. In that letter, after citing
Tiffany and subsequent decisions, the Comptroller stated:
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V. THE IMPACT OF THE

Marquette

DECISION

A. The Supreme Court's Holding
In Marquette, a unanimous Court squarely held that the Allowance
Clause in section 85 applies to interstate credit transactions. 78 The
underlying controversy involved the terms of a credit card agreement
between a national bank organized in Nebraska and cardholders who
were residents of Minnesota. 17 9 The cardholders had agreed to pay
interest at rates permitted under Nebraska law but usurious in Minnesota.' 8 0 After concluding that a bank was normally located in the state
where it is organized,' 8 ' the Court held that it could not be "deprived"
of that location even where its out-of-state customers had been acquired
through an intensive mail solicitation program. 8 2 The Court thus held,
under a literal application of the Allowance Clause, that "interest rates
of one State [can be] 'exported' into another" without regard to common law or statutory choice of law rules that would apply in the absence
of section 85.188
It is conceded that none of these decisions precisely cover the situation
submitted by you, namely a situation where a single class of lenders
such as those in the small loan business are permitted to charge a rate
of interest greater than the rate generally applicable to other lenders
in the State. However, it is our opinion that since National Banks
have the power to engage in the small loan business without subjecting themselves to the licensing powers of the States, in the light of
the statements made in the Tiffany case, supra, National Banks will
be deemed entitled to charge the same rate of interest as may be
charged by others in the State in competition with the National Bank
in the small loan business.
Letter from J.F.T. O'Connor, Comptroller, supra note 89. The state licensing
preemption remains an integral part of the Comptroller's ruling. See 12
C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1982).
178. Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S.
299 (1978).
179. Id. at 302-03.
180. Id. at 310-13.
181. Id. at 310. It should be noted that the Court did not hold that a
bank would always be located where it was organized. See id. The Court
observed that the transactions in question were handled by mail and that
credit decisions, assessment of finance charges, and application of payments all
took place in Nebraska. Id. at 310-12. These facts are too narrow to establish
a broad general rule, particularly with respect to business loans. See Nassberg,
Loan Documentation: Basic but Crucial, 36 Bus. LAW. 843, 869-70 (1981).
Nevertheless, the factual predicate in Marquette is broad enough to cover
most interstate consumer transactions under current restrictions on interstate
branching. See 439 U.S. at 309-13 & n.20.
182. Id. A holding that the bank was "located" in Minnesota would have
"deprived" it of the right to charge the higher Nebraska rate under the
Allowance Clause. See id. at 302-03; 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. IV 1980).
183. 439 U.S. at 314. Choice of law rules were not discussed in the
Marquette opinion, since the holding clearly preempted their application.
See id. at 318 n.31 ("[t]o the extent the enumerated federal rates of interest
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It was argued in Marquette that because state-chartered banks would
normally be restricted to rates allowed by the state in which the borrower
resides, 184 permitting national banks to engage in exportation would
place them at a competitive advantage. 185 The Court rejected this
argument by noting that national banks had enjoyed a competitive
interest rate advantage over state banks since Tiffany.' s 6 The Court
adopted the position that absent evidence of contrary legislative intent,
the Allowance Clause must be held to apply, as its language indicates,
87
to "any loan," including those transacted across state lines.
B. Legislative Proposals to Reverse Marquette
At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Marquette, the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits had already held that national banks could
export interest rates under section 85.188 In response to these decisions,
a Senate bill was introduced to prohibit interest rate exportation beare greater than permissible state rates, state usury laws must, of course, give
way to the federal statute"). In the absence of § 85, the choice of law rule
would have been provided by a Minnesota statute under which any credit card
agreement with a Minnesota resident was subject to that state's usury ceiling.
Id. at 302 n.4. Where no such statute applies, the trend is to accord the
consumer borrower the usury law protection of the state of his residence.
See Note, Bus. LAW. 1311, 1313 (1980). For a bank located in a state with
liberal usury laws, the ability to export interest rates can prove valuable. See
generally Pederson & Cox, Choice of Law and Usury Limits Under Texas Law
and the National Bank Act, 34 Sw. L.J. 755, 779-87 (1980). See also note 210
and accompanying text infra.
184. See note 183 supra.
185. 439 U.S. at 313-14.
186. Id. at 314. The Court then cited the most favored lender doctrine
as an example of such favoritism. Id. at 314 n.26. For a discussion of
Marquette's reference to the most favored lender doctrine, see notes 111-12
and accompanying text supra. The Court also observed that its holding
discriminates more acutely against all banks located in states where interest
rate ceilings are relatively low. 439 U.S. at 314.
187. 439 U.S. at 308. The Court's decision not to depart from the plain
meaning of the statutory phrase "on any loan" was reached after it was unable
to find evidence of contrary intent in the legislative history of § 30 or in the
economic setting in which the statute was enacted. Id. at 314-17. Assuming
the plain meaning of "on any loan" applies with equal force to the remaining
portions of § 85's first sentence, the result in Marquette might have been
reached on the basis of the Exception Clause. For the text of the Exception
Clause, see text accompanying note 29 supra. The Nebraska bank could have
argued that even though it might be "located" in Minnesota for purposes of
transactions with Minnesota residents, it was immutably organized in Nebraska.
See id. Therefore, under the Exception Clause, the "different," i.e. higher,
rate available to banks organized in Nebraska should be available for exportation into Minnesota. See id.
188. See Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1977);
Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
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tween national banks and their credit card customers. 8 9 Six months
after Marquette, a similar bill was introduced in the House of Representatives.' 90 Although the proposed legislation appears to have been
directed primarily at limiting federal interference with the operation of
state usury law, commentary written while the latter bill was pending
viewed it as a partial remedy for the competitive imbalance recognized
by the Supreme Court in Marquette and amplified by the holding in
that case.' 9 ' Both anti-exportation bills died in committee, 92 and in
light of other legislation then under consideration or recently enacted,
that result is not surprising. As is clearly indicated by the scope of the
interest rate preemption provisions in DIDAMCA and its predecessor
statutes, the sentiment in Congress ran directly contra to the preserva93
tion of state control over interest rate ceilings.'

VI.

THE

Marquette

HOLDING AND THE MOST FAVORED LENDER DOCTRINE

UNDER SECTIONS

521

TO

523-A

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The FDIC and the FHLBB have issued interpretive letters in which
they conclude that sections 521 to 523 authorize interest rate exportation. l94 The soundness of this conclusion, as well as the underlying
weaknesses in the most favored lender interpretation, can be confirmed
by examining the "rate allowed" language in light of Marquette and
the legislative activity it precipitated. 19 5
In Marquette, the Supreme Court unequivocally deferred to the
plain meaning of the "rate allowed" language as it appears in the Allowance Clause of section 85.196 The Court held that notwithstanding the
obvious friction with longstanding choice of law principles, the "rate
allowed" wording means exactly what it says, even when applied to
interstate credit.' 97 The identical language, introduced in the Senate
189. S. 2964, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 10,928-29 (1978) (introduced by Sen. Anderson). For the text of this bill, see text accompanying
note 209 infra.
190. H.R. 4208, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H3674-75 (daily ed.
May 23, 1979) (introduced by Rep. McCormack).
191. See Note, supra note 183, at 1313; Note, J. CORP. LAW 189, 209 &
n.150 (1979).
192. [1977-1978] CONG. INDEX (CCH) 20,523; [1979-1980] CONG. INDEX
(CCH) 35,023.
193. See notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra.
194. See FDIC Staff Interpretation Letter dated March 17, 1981; FHLBB
Ops. Gen. Counsel, dated Feb. 25, 1981. The interpretations are based on
Marquette's construction of the Allowance Clause. Id.
195. For a discussion of Marquette, see notes 178-87 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of the legislative proposals to reverse Marquette, see
notes 188-93 and accompanying text supra.
196. See note 187 and accompanying text supra.
197. See id.
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less than a year after Marquette was decided, 98 can only be construed
as a succinct authorization of interest rate exportation when enacted in
the linguistic context of sections 521 to 523.199
The most favored lender doctrine, on the other hand, is only in200
It is
directly derived from a century-old Supreme Court decision.
grounded primarily in the Comptroller's ruling and validating case law
which preceded DIDAMCA's enactment by several years. 201 The nexus
between the most favored lender doctrine and the "rate allowed" language can be discerned only by reference to these sources of authority
which are extrinsic to the legislative history of DIDAMCA and to the
wording of sections 521 to 523.202
The chronological proximity of DIDAMCA's enactment and the
rejection of the legislative proposals to reverse Marquette is an indication that the exportation issue had the attention of Congress when
sections 521 to 523 were drafted and considered, and that congressional
sentiment during this period strongly favored preemption of state usury
law.203 It reasonably follows that sections 521 to 523 were intended in
198. See note 146 supra. S. 1988, which contained the text ultimately
adopted as §§ 521-523, was introduced on November 7, 1979. See id. Marquette was decided on December 19, 1978. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
199. See note 187 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that
familiarity with the Marquette decision is not necessarily required to reach the
conclusion that the "rate allowed" language authorizes interest rate exportation.
See text accompanying note 140 supra. That conclusion follows from the plain
meaning of the words, once it is recognized that "the rate that the [insured
institution] would be permitted to charge in the absence of [§§ 521-523]" is
determined with regard to choice of law principles. See id.
200. For a discussion of the relationship between Tiffany and the most
favored lender doctrine, see notes 100-25 and accompanying text supra.
201. See notes 82-99 and accompanying text supra.
202. See notes 136-55 and accompanying text supra.
203. See notes 189-90 and accompanying text supra. H.R. 4208 was introduced and referred to the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs in May, 1979. See note 190 supra. During the previous month, that
Committee had held hearings on H.R. 2515, the bill enacted as a temporary
measure on November 5, 1979 as Pub. L. No. 96-104 and ultimately reenacted
by DIDAMCA §§511-512. See note 7 supra; State Usury Ceilings: Hearings
on H.R. 2515 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions, Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). During those hearings, the Comptroller of the Currency offered the following statement:
The United States Supreme Court was first asked to interpret
section 30 in the Tiffany case. That landmark decision held that
Congress intended the statute to give "advantages to national banks
over their state competitors."
Congress created an even greater advantage in 1933 when it
enacted the current provision entitling national banks to elect to peg
interest to the Federal Reserve discount rate in lieu of the applicable
state limit. The principal sponsor of that amendment, Senator Glass,
argued persuasively that when the discount rate exceeded the state
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part to allow all insured institutions to share the privilege which
Marquette confirmed for national banks and which Congress was un204
willing to revoke.
In contrast, the absence of congressional focus on the most favored
lender doctrine can be deduced from the remarks of Senator Anderson
upon his introduction of the Senate bill (prior to Marquette) to prohibit
exportation. 205 The Senator referred generally to "several court decisions
[which] have concluded that out-of-state banks may charge Minnesota
credit card customers the higher rate allowed by the state where the
bank is located." 206 Two of the decisions to which Senator Anderson
was undoubtedly referring contained in their opinions extensive and
deferential discussions of the Comptroller's ruling in which the "competitive equality" ramifications of the most favored lender doctrine were
prominently mentioned. 207 Although no reference to the Comptroller's
interest rate ceilings, national banks had to be the instrumentalities
to permit businesses to borrow money to avoid possible collapse.
This past December these advantages were again reaffirmed as
the Supreme Court echoed the words of Tiffany. In the Marquette
National Bank case, perhaps its most significant decision on usury
since 1873, the Court held that the law allows a national bank to
provide credit anywhere, in any state, subject exclusively to the
interest rate ceiling of its home state or the alternative formula in
the federal statute.
Hearings on H.R. 2515, supra, at 150-51 (statement of John G. Heimann,
Comptroller of the Currency). The Comptroller's statement is remarkable
because it refers vaguely to the "advantage" conferred by Tiffany while
awkwardly avoiding any mention of the most favored lender doctrine and the
Comptroller's own ruling. Id. It also emphasizes rather forcefully the significance of the competitive advantages created by Marquette. Id.
The impact of the Comptroller's statement was not lost on the state banking authorities whose interests are predominantly local and anti-exportation.
See Hearings on S. 1988, supra note 148, at 153-54 (statement of E.D. Dunn,
Commissioner of Banking, State of Georgia, Representing the Conference of
State Bank Supervisors). In December, 1979, Mr. Dunn proposed that both
S. 1988 (ultimately enacted as §§ 521-523) and § 85 be amended so that (a) after
two years, the provisions of S. 1988 would automatically expire, and (b) upon
expiration of S. 1988, interest rate exportation would no longer be permitted
under § 85. See id. at 154. This proposal indicates that authorization of
interest rate exportation was clearly understood to comprise a material component of S. 1988. See id. at 153-54.
204. See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. at
319. The Court clearly mandated a congressional policy determination by
ending its opinion with the observation that "[t]he protection of state usury
laws is an issue of legislative policy, and any plea to alter § 85 to further that
end is better addressed to the wisdom of Congress than to the judgment of
this Court." Id.
205. See 124 CONG. REc. 10,928-29 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Anderson).
206. Id. at 10,928.
207. See Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d 255, 259-61 (8th
Cir. 1977); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 538 F.2d 1284, 1288-90 (7th
Cir. 1976). The Senator would also have been referring to the decision of the
Minnesota Supreme Court, later affirmed in Marquette, which was essentially
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ruling or to the most favored lender doctrine appears in the Senator's
remarks, 208 the bill itself addressed the competitive inequalities which
may result from interest rate exportation. The bill would have amended
section 85 by adding the following sentence:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an association may not . . . charge a credit card customer who is a

resident of a State other than the State in which the association
is located a rate of interest on credit extended by the use of
such card which exceeds the rate which a bank organized under
the laws of that other State may charge such a customer.2 9
It must also be recognized that interest rate exportation is more
likely to have been under consideration by Congress because it can be
authorized only by a federal statute.2 10 Extension of the most favored
lender doctrine, however, can be accomplished at the state level.21 '
Moreover, as indicated in the previous analysis of the agencies' interpretations, where licensing and procedural regulations impact the application of the most favored lender doctrine, effective extension of the
doctrine to state-chartered institutions under sections 521 to 523 may
2 12
depend on the cooperation of state regulators.
Finally, it should be noted that the wording of sections 521 to 523
originated in Senate and House bills introduced by the two Senators
and four Representatives from Arkansas. 2 18 Since that state has a blanket
interest rate ceiling of ten percent, there are no "favored lenders" under
a deferral to the Eighth Circuit's holding in Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of
Omaha. See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 262 N.W.2d
358, 365 (Minn. 1977), cert. granted, 436 U.S. 916, afi'd, 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
208. See 124

CONG.

REc. 10,928-29 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Anderson).

209. S. 2964, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 10,928 (1978).
210. See Note, supra note 183, at 1311-12 & 1311 n.2. State statutes which
prohibit exportation of interest rate ceilings into a particular state, such as the
Minnesota statute in Marquette, have repeatedly withstood constitutional challenges in the absence of preemptive federal law. Aldens, Inc. v. Ryan, 571
F.2d 1159 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); Aldens, Inc. v.
LaFollette, 552 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977); Aldens,
Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., Aldens, Inc.
v. Kane, 425 U.S. 943 (1976). Similarly, state statutes such as Delaware's
Financial Center Development Act, which allows out-of-state bank holding
companies to establish Delaware-located banks for interest rate exportation
purposes, would be generally ineffective in the absence of § 85 per Marquette
or DIDAMCA § 521. See 63 Del. Laws, ch. 2, §§ 2-23 (1981); 6 DEL. J. CORP.
LAW 104, 105 nn.3 & 7 (1981).
211. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:13B-1, B-2 (Supp. 1982); Act of Apr.
8, 1982, No. 79, 1982 Pa. Legis. Serv. 377 (to be codified at PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 7, § 319 (Supp. 1982)).
212. See notes 168-77 and accompanying text supra.
213. See note 146 and accompanying text supra.
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Arkansas usury law. 214

It hardly seems likely, therefore, that the state's

entire congressional delegation would have taken the initiative to sponsor
legislation aimed at extending the most favored lender doctrine.215 On
the other hand, the Arkansas delegates would unquestionably have had
a keen interest in allowing all federally insured lenders to export the
higher interest rates of other states into Arkansas, thereby expanding
216
the supply of credit available to Arkansas residents.
VII. CONCLUSION
DIDAMCA's extension of the alternative federal rate of one percent
over the discount rate to all federally insured lenders is an acknowledgement of the anachronism of "national favorite" status for national
banks.217 It would arguably have been logical for Congress to have
enacted a parallel extension of the most favored lender doctrine as
well. 218

In concluding that Congress actually did so, however, three

federal agencies have erroneously construed sections 521 to 523.219 They
214. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
215. See id. It is particularly unrealistic to conclude that the Arkansas
Congressmen would have jeopardized enactment of the alternative federal rate

provision, which they considered crucial to their state's economy, in order to
sponsor an ancillary provision that would not affect their constituency. See 126
CONG. REc. S3177-80 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers).
216. See notes 178-87 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, if the "rate
allowed" language was intended to incorporate both the most favored lender
doctrine and interstate exportation, as the FDIC and FHLBB have suggested, it

is not apparent why the legislative initiative for §§ 521-523 came exclusively
from the Arkansas Senators and Representatives.

See notes 146 & 194 and

accompanying text supra.
217. See note 150 and accompanying text supra.

fied.

218. Limiting a federal privilege to national banks can no longer be justiSee First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339,

358 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In arguing against broad immunity from
state taxation, three Justices subscribed to the following assessment:
Today the national banks perform no significant fiscal services to

the Federal Government not performed by their state competitors. Any
federally insured bank, state or national, may be a government depository. The principal checking accounts of the Government are carried
today, not by national banks, but by the Federal Reserve banks. When
a new issue of government securities is offered, the Federal Reserve
banks receive the applications of purchasers. When government securities are to be redeemed or exchanged, the transactions are handled by
the Federal Reserve banks. Those banks administer for the Treasury
the tax and loan deposit accounts of the banks in their respective
districts.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Congress has very recently

recognized that federal insurance of depository institutions is now a critical
structural component of our modern banking system. See House Pledges "Full
Faith and Credit" of U.S. for Federal Deposit Insurance, [Jan.-June] WASH.
FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 12, at A-19 (Mar. 22, 1982).
219. See notes 162-216 and accompanying text supra.
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have adduced a congressional intent that is neither manifest in the legislative history, nor discernible by reasonable inference. 220 They have
failed to recognize the underlying inconsistency between their interpretations of sections 521 to 523 and the continuing applicability of
state licensing and procedural requirements. 221 And they have not considered the possibility that the statutory language they have interpreted
is exclusively accounted for by a more reasonable construction which
allows interest rate exportation under Marquette.222 It is therefore submitted that the agencies' interpretations are vulnerable to court chal223
lenge, even under a deferential standard of judicial review.
William G. Bornstein
220. See notes 156-67 and accompanying text supra.
221. See notes 168-77 and accompanying text supra.
222. See notes 178-216 and accompanying text supra.
223. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976). The Court
referred to the following quotation as "[t]he most comprehensive statement of
the role of interpretative rulings .... ":
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the [administrative agency], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of
their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.
The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it the power to persuade, if lacking the power to
control.
Id. at 141-42, quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss5/10

38

